Supporting People with Cognitive Disability with Decision-Making: Any Australian Law Reform Contributions?

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[A] Introduction.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (‘CRPD’) has turned the spotlight on decision-making by people with cognitive impairments, particularly the role of ‘supported decision-making’ as a replacement for the proxy decision-making powers under traditional adult guardianship legislation (Carney & Tait, 1997). How to achieve this has recently been considered by the Victorian and Australian Law Reform Commissions (ALRC, 2014; VLRC, 2012) and the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO, 2013, 2014).

Accessing assistance in making decisions engages four main groups (Carney, 2015b): people with developmental disability (Carney, 2013a; Kohn & Blumenthal, 2014); people with a mental illness (Pathare & Shields, 2012); people with an acquired brain injury (Knox, Douglas, & Bigby, 2012a, 2012b); and people living with dementia (Fetherstonhaugh, Tarzia, Bauer, Nay, & Beattie, 2014). Assisted decision-making takes many different forms (ADACAS, 2013; Boundy & Fleischner, 2013; Browning, 2010; Then, 2013). There is limited agreement about basic concepts and principles (Carney, 2014) but it is useful to distinguish between support for decision-making and supported decision-making which engages legal capacity (Browning, Bigby, & Douglas, 2014).

Many supports have their existence outside and quite independently of the law, whether within civil society or service systems (Power, Lord, & deFranco, 2013), or simply recognise or weave them together, as with the Canadian ‘support networks’ or the potential strands of mentors, contacts, escorts and others under Sweden’s ‘PO Skåne’ scheme (Gooding, 2012: 12, 14). Some laws about support are very ‘light touch’, such as ones overcoming privacy barriers to a third party accessing information to assist a person; or the communication conduit provided by ‘correspondence nominees’ (Carney & Beaupert, 2013: 185). Others engage ‘high
stakes’ issues like property dealings or negotiation of funding packages under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (‘NDIS’).

This paper reviews the issues raised in both the lighter and the heavier contexts, examines recent law reform recommendations, and evaluates Victoria’s 2014 reforms (for more extended treatment of international developments and theoretical issues, see: Carney, 2015b). It argues that policy conundrums are compounded by a lack of evidence about the suitability-for-purpose or the efficacy of either legislated or informal schemes of supported decision-making, adding weight to calls to hasten slowly with implementation of the many permutations of such schemes internationally. It is concluded that the ALRC reforms are more comprehensively in tune with international treaty principles and better targeted on ordinary day-to-day needs of people with cognitive impairments. The paper further argues that while recent Victorian reform initiatives are to be commended for progressing Australia’s first elective or appointed supported decision-making model, they are roundly to be criticised for labelling them as supported attorneys and supported guardians. The paper is also critical of Victoria’s retrograde proposal for expedited appointments of parents as guardians or administrators of children with cognitive impairments on turning 18.

[B] Background.

Under Australia’s federal system of government, the States and Territories are invested with the constitutional power to make laws about issues such as guardianship, ordinary or enduring powers attorney, health decision-making or supported decision-making. The national (Commonwealth) government is restricted to making laws incidental to enumerated heads of power such as over social security, health funding, funding of residential aged care, or in order to implement international treaties (Carney, 2013b). Partly because of its federal structure, Australia has been slow to legislate supported decision-making compared to Canada or Sweden (Gooding, 2014: 110-111; Gordon, 2000; LCO, 2014: 126-130 [Canada], 130-31 [Sweden]). Yet, although the Commonwealth Government made an interpretive reservation when ratifying the CRPD to preserve its right to allow States and
Territories to retain guardianship as a ‘last resort’ (ALRC, 2014: 48), pressure for reform of guardianship is mounting. The forceful insistence by the UN monitoring committee in its May 2014 General Comment on complete ‘abolition of substitute decision-making regimes’ and its immediate replacement by supported decision-making alternatives (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2014: para 28) has now given added urgency to progressing debates about supported decision-making within legal, policy and practice circles.

While recommended by a NSW Parliamentary Committee in 2010 (Standing Committee on Social Issues, 2010: 63), Victoria has been the first to introduce legislation for supported decision-making, though as explained below, the reforms fell short of the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s proposals and aspects were poorly drafted. Some reform caution is warranted. International evidence of what types of assisted decision-making regimes ‘work’ is lacking (Carney & Beaupert, 2013; Kohn & Blumenthal, 2014; Kohn, Blumenthal, & Campbell, 2013; LCO, 2014: 123-24). Nor is it known to what personal characteristics it appeals (such as cultural preferences for ‘collaboration’) or to which categories of people with cognitive impairment, such as suggestions that it is most suited to people with strong communal ties, and works best for people with developmental disabilities (see for example, LCO, 2014: 124; 135-36). Australian pilot studies of different models of assistance are few in number, small in scale and unable to afford a rigorous evaluative design (Carney, 2014). They also concentrate on assessing the more extensive forms of assistance to the neglect of the more routine or ordinary situations where assistance may be needed.

It is always sensible to be cautious about introducing the law into areas previously governed informally, but some expansion of legal engagement with support for decision-making may now be warranted, along lines discussed in the next section.
Recent Australian Reforms or Proposals for Reform.

There has not been any lack of concrete recommendations and models for possible reform of traditional adult guardianship laws.

The Victorian Law Reform Commission in its 2012 Final Report proposed to complement traditional guardianship and administration orders by adding two new measures, each able to be made either by appointment by the person or after applying to VCAT for an order: namely supported decision-making and co-decision-making (VLRC, 2012: paras 8.13-8.31; 8.78-87). In its November 2014 Final Report the Australian Law Reform Commission for its part devoted much attention to specifying overarching objects and guiding principles for a proposed reform template strongly preferencing nomination of ‘supporters’ over last resort appointments of ‘representatives’ (ALRC, 2014: para 3.4 and Ch 3 generally).

1. The Australian law reform proposals

Because of its limited constitutional responsibility for the broad field of guardianship or its alternatives, Commonwealth law lacks any provision for guardianship or a specialised tribunal to adjudicate on the need for proxy decision-makers. Instead in areas of direct constitutional responsibility such as social security, it has relied on ‘nominee’ provisions enabling bureaucrats to direct social security payments to someone other than the pensioner (Creyke, 1990), or its later addition of appointments of less intrusive ‘correspondence nominees’. This model then informed recent NDIS arrangements for ‘plan nominees’. Existing nominee powers vary considerably in their impact on the rights and lives of people affected. Payment nominees acquire money management powers, but these powers are less extensive than those under State or Territory financial guardianship orders or even an enduring power of financial management. Correspondence nominees handle some potentially sensitive social security letters (impacting on privacy) and are responsible for ensuring compliance with payment requirements, but the intent here is more facilitative of the rights of the person; though irrespective of their form, they all necessarily detract from recognition of the principle of consumer ‘choice and control’.
‘Plan nominees’ under the NDIS, however, exercise powers more akin to those of personal or financial guardians, configuring the very resources from which a person will construct their living conditions and lifestyle (National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 78, 84), as recognised by the ALRC in proposing that such powers be re-labeled as the last resort appointment of ‘representatives’ (ALRC, 2014: para 5.33). Indeed, the very gravity of these issues has been recognised as generating a need for extended guardianship powers, as illustrated in the NSW case of Re KCG ([2014] NSW CATGD 7) where the tribunal (‘NSWCAT’) appointed the Public Guardian, due to a lack of informal support in making the ‘important lifestyle and financial decisions’ at stake (at para [67]) even though a financial manager was in place; or the decisions to appoint a guardian for someone outside the NDIS but who shared accommodation with someone who was covered (Re NZO [2014] NSW CATGD 9), or the Tasmanian ruling seeing anticipated NDIS needs as one factor justifying appointment (Re BSC (Guardianship and Administration) [2013] TASGAB 7 at para [9]). Certainly guardianship was declined by NWSCAT for a parent seeking to ‘strengthen her hand’ with the NDIS (Re KTT [2014] NSW CATGD 6 paras [29]-[33]), something that the ALRC rightly saw as a task for a ‘supporter’ (ALRC, 2014: para 5.50). However the first two cases demonstrate the considerable overlap and intersecting relationships between the NDIS and traditional guardianship, as borne out by the 85 guardianship appointments requested in the NSW trial site by late 2014 (ALRC, 2014: para 5.94) despite Victoria’s commendable resistance to making such appointments so far (OPA, 2014: 27 [OPA receiving just 7 such appointments and generally preferring OPA’s advocacy role, though the number of private appointments is not known]).

In 2014 the ALRC broad-ranging report on its reference to inquire in reforms needed to realise CRPD principles in Commonwealth law was tabled (for a more extended discussion see, Carney, 2015b). The report recommended replacing existing nominee laws or other arrangements (in social security, e-health, aged care, and the NDIS), by its proposed template (tailored as needed to particular portfolio areas), leaving it to portfolio departments to decide whether to extend the template to new fields. Informed by the ALRC’s five ‘framing’ principles of dignity, equality,
autonomy, inclusion and participation, and accountability (2014: para 1.34), the Commission formulated (and further elaborates as guidelines), four decision-making principles: the right of all persons to make and have decisions respected; to be supported to make decisions; for supported decisions to be directed by the ‘will, preferences and rights’ of the person; and for provision of appropriate safeguards. These principles would inform two kinds of possible appointments where autonomous decision-making or informal assistance was inadequate: appointment of a ‘supporter’ or, as a last resort, appointment of a ‘representative’ (ALRC, 2014: 99-119). The role of a ‘supporter’, largely reprises (with a few alterations) the scope of responsibilities of existing correspondence nominees and would presumptively be appointed and terminated by the person. However review or oversight of appointments of representatives by such bureaucrats is rather left hanging by the ALRC in the absence of an appropriate national tribunal to review such decisions (ALRC, 2014: paras 4.102-4.113). The only (limited) proposed protection lies in its otherwise very sensible proposal that State and Territory tribunals be approached before the CEO appoints an NDIS representative (ibid, para 5.91).

T-model Ford laws for the average citizen like the existing ‘nominee’ powers or pre-ordained legislative appointments have long been a part of the law of course; one classic example is the ‘statutory will’ for a person who dies intestate (Burns, 2013: 470, n 3 [6-8% in most of Australia; 10% in WA and 14% in Qld]). In the field of medical care (further, VLRC, 2012: Ch 13), another is the commonly enacted medical ‘statutory default’ decision-makers (in NSW the ‘person responsible’ under Part 5E of the Guardianship Act 1987, or under Part 9 of the Victorian Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014). Such provisions establish a ‘hierarchy’ of close relative or friends who are automatically authorised in advance to consent to basic medical or dental care of a person otherwise unable to give their own consent outside an emergency situation (further, White, Willmott, & Then, 2014: 244-248). However as these laws well illustrate, there is always a balancing out of the gravity of the matter against the convenience and economy of such ‘off the peg’ laws. Routine, low-risk, or common situations are the main ones catered for, with some regimes also including more major health decisions; but contentious issues (such as irreversible
procedures) are generally outside their remit, as in Victoria. The ALRC found these health provisions to be ‘complex’ and in need of review to better conform to its decision-making template and principles, but beyond this it shed little light on how or to what extent supporters might take over the work of such proxy decision-makers (ALRC, 2014: paras 10.44-10.62, esp 10.60).

Would ALRC proposals for re-naming social security or other ‘payment nominees’ as the ‘representatives’ they are, really make them the ‘last resort’, mainly replaced by supporters; or is the greater concern that appointments are made by a bureaucrat? For Centrelink payment nominees my view is that the proposed safeguards for people with cognitive impairment are currently too weak a protection to risk making many supporter appointments in such cases (Carney, 2015 in preparation). Can the ALRC model regarding the even more expansive grants of authority such as those entailed for NDIS plan nominees, or those involving ‘weightier’ issues (such as management of NDIS entitlements), possibly achieve its objectives before State and Territory laws are reformed in line with ALRC principles and until major gatekeeping responsibilities are entrusted to their expert decision-making and safeguards agencies (also OPA, 2014: 16, 19-20, 24, 26, 28-29)? Does the ALRCs ‘two part template’ of supporters and representatives risk unintended consequences? None of these questions are easy to answer — raising as they do delicate issues about possible ‘net-widening’ (regulating aspects of life currently not governed by law), undue paternalism and aversion to risk, or unintended consequences — issues explored more fully elsewhere (Carney, 2013a, 2015a, 2015b).

So what does Victoria’s recent initiative tell us about the possible law reform contribution from the States and Territories? Unfortunately, not much.

2. Victoria’s 2014 legislative reforms.

The Guardianship and Administration Bill 2014 (‘G&A Bill 2014’) introduced but not passed prior to the then Government’s defeat at the 2014 State Election (with no indications so far of reintroduction by the incoming Government), and the companion Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (‘PA Act 2014’) enacted in August 2014 but yet to come into force, provides only for the first of the VLRCs two main proposals
legislating only for supported decision-making and not for co-decision-makers (for Canadian co-decision making see: LCO, 2014: 138-39).

The Minister’s Second Reading Speech to the G&A Bill 2014 explained that the then Government had accepted the need for legislation to deal with ‘the perceived “catch 22” situation’ for someone having a level of decision-making capacity precluding appointment of a guardian, ‘but yet they cannot take advantage of the decision-making capacity they do possess unless there is someone with the legal authority to assist them to make and implement their decisions.’ Recognition of the role of supporters was seen as a ‘significant change’ which ‘enhances the ability of a person with impaired decision-making capacity to make decisions for themselves and to participate more fully in the life of the community.’ (Hansard, LA, 21/8/2014, p 2941). Consistent with this, the G&A Bill 2014 commendably incorporated VLRC proposals enabling supporters to access information otherwise accessible only by the person (cl. 100) and to communicate or facilitate communication of any other relevant information on behalf of the person being assisted (cl. 101), as well as to take reasonable steps to implement a person’s decision (other than those entailing a ‘significant financial transaction’, as defined to include real estate: cl. 102). The proposed legislation also covered fiduciary responsibilities of assistants (cl. 103), clarified that their powers are subsidiary to any guardianship or administration order (cl 104), and would have enabled supporters to seek advice from VCAT (cl 105).

Enactment of Part 7 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (‘PAA 2014’) for its part, has already implemented the VLRC recommendation that wherever feasible appointment of supporters be made by the person themselves. As noted by Burgen and Chesterman (2014), compared to the capacity standard for executing a valid enduring power of attorney, a lower threshold is required to appoint a supportive attorney (namely, an understanding of the enabling/facilitating role of a supporter, that the person chooses the supporter, that decisions remain those of the person, and retaining control over its starting and ending: PAA2014, s 86(2)(a)-(e)). Provided there are adequate protections, this is a welcome step (Carney, 2015b).
However the G&A Bill 2014 if enacted, would have adopted the term ‘supportive guardian’ for such assisted decision-maker appointments, rather than the VLRCs choice of ‘supporter’. This would have mirrored the mistake made by the PAA 2014 in calling private planning appointees ‘supportive attorneys’. These labels are both highly regrettable, seemingly designed to maximise the risk of the public assuming that the appointee is a real attorney or guardian, when in fact a supportive attorney is at best clothed with powers akin to those of correspondence nominees under Commonwealth law (or those of the ALRC’s proposed ‘supporters’), while cl 99(2) of the G&A Bill also made clear that supportive guardians were to be invested with none of the powers of substitute decision-making of a real guardian. Certainly terminology can be fraught (even the ALRC’s term ‘representative’ for a proxy decision-maker did not escape unscathed, ALRC, 2014: para 4.40), but Victoria could hardly have chosen less wisely on this aspect.

That said, the lapsed Bill did have two potentially attractive features in the form of personalising and further shrinking resort to guardianship.

a. ‘Personalising’ and ‘shrinking the coverage’ of guardianship and enduring powers of attorney?

Guardians properly so-called have of course long been directed to fully support realisation of the interests of the represented person (see G&A Act 1986 s 28).

Under the proposals of the G&A Bill 2014, this sentiment would have been further elevated for guardianship by incorporating revised principles mirroring those enacted in section 21 of the PAA2014 to bring enduring powers of attorney and the new supported attorney appointments more closely into line with international norms. Taking the G&A Bill 2014 as the exemplar, this entailed obligations of appointees to give ‘practicable and appropriate support to enable that person to participate in decisions affecting the person as much as possible in the circumstances’ (G&A Bill 2014, cl 7(a)(ii)); ‘give all practicable and appropriate effect to the represented person’s wishes’ (cl 7(b)(i)); ‘take any steps that are reasonably available to encourage the represented person to participate in decision making, even though the represented person does not have decision making capacity’ (cl
7(b)(ii)); and ‘act in a way that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of the represented person’ (cl 7(b)(iii)). Clause 3(4) elaborated promotion of personal and social wellbeing as including recognising a person’s ‘inherent dignity’, having regard to their ‘existing supportive relationships, religion, values and cultural and linguistic environment’ and respect for confidential information (cl 3(4)(a)-(c)). Such an individualisation of guardianship would arguably be intrinsically worthy in its own right (though falling short of CRPD abolition interpretations). It would give substance to international suggestions that reformed guardianship enshrining ‘person-centred’ principles differs little from supported decision-making (Boundy & Fleischner, 2013: 13; Johns, 2012: 1543-44, 1558). Even so, the very narrowness of the gap between substitute and supported decision-making options may risk muddying public understanding. Similar blurring might of course also occur between enduring powers of attorney and the newly enacted supportive attorney.

The Victorian guardianship reform proposal might theoretically have further shrunk the pool of people subject to traditional guardianship through the inclusion of additional guiding principles in clause 29(d)(ii), directing that consideration be had to ‘negotiation, mediation or similar means’ as an alternative to making an order. While decisions about substantive rights at stake in guardianship may rarely lend themselves to mediation (Productivity Commission, 2014: 365-66 [currently rarely used by VCAT]), this does not mean that ADR has no role to play in case intake and general case management. Such a power proved quite popular at the case intake level in NSW, where despite initial resistance to conciliation of guardianship at the application stage, it reportedly diverted around a third (30%) of the caseload by 2010 (Standing Committee on Social Issues, 2010: 71). Mediation has also been touted overseas as a means of bringing the law into closer conformity with Article 12 of the CRPD (Wright, 2014/15 forthcoming).

However these more attractive features of the G&A Bill were off-set by the unfortunate provisions for expedited orders.
b. Back to the future? Expedited appointment of parents as guardians or administrators

The G&A Bill 2014 provided in cl 35, 41 for an expedited avenue for ‘on the papers’ appointment of a parent as guardian of an adult. The main criterion for such an appointment was to be written evidence from a medical practitioner that ‘because of the …person’s disability, the person does not have decision-making capacity to make a supportive attorney appointment or an enduring power of attorney’ (cl 36(1)(b)(i)(A)). This measure appeared to stem from the quite unwarranted public ‘consternation’ first detected by the Cocks Committee in the early 1980s about an absence of parental power after age 18. The Cocks Committee flatly rejected this call, stating that it ‘does not believe that parents will need to apply for guardianship as a matter of course as their child approaches the age of 18’, emphasising that ‘guardians should only be appointed if some benefit is likely to accrue to the subject of the guardianship application ...(or ...some detriment avoided).’ (Victoria, 1982: 19).

The proposed criteria for expedited appointment under the G&A Bill 2014 were essentially a ‘capacity test’ of the kind so strongly disapproved of by the CRPD, and it seriously risked ‘net widening’ by making unnecessary appointments for people for whom existing informal arrangements are adequate and more consistent with realisation of their autonomy. The much tighter set of criteria proposed by the VLRC report (2012: rec 176), surely provided a suite of more sophisticated protections against that risk, by insisting on showing ‘one of the following’ of (i) a need for a decision to be made ‘now or reasonably soon’, which decision ‘would not be able to be made’ without an appointment, or their ‘personal and social wellbeing can best be promoted’ by such an appointment; or (ii) that there are ‘ongoing decisions to be made in relation to the person’s lifestyle or finances’ and or their ‘personal and social wellbeing can best be promoted’ by such an appointment; or (iii) the person’s decision-making ‘is so significantly impaired and enduring that they are unlikely at any time in the future to make their own decisions, even with significant support’ and people are and have been making similar decisions for a ‘significant period of time’ and there is a ‘broad consensus among carers and others’ that the
role is appropriate, and that if able to communicate their wishes the person would not object.

As originally drafted, the G&A Bill 2014 also purported to make it procedurally imperative for VCAT to make an order where notified parties either did not object to the proposed appointment or failed to respond at all, unless VCAT was not satisfied about the quality of the supporting documentation, or concluded that the represented person did not ‘want the order to be made’, or had ‘other concerns that VCAT wishe[d] to consider at a hearing’ (cl 41(2)(a)(i)-(ii)). Clause 41(2)(b) provided a similar reservation where VCAT concluded that ‘based on the evidence in the application and any submissions received by VCAT, there is a significant risk that the order sought would be harmful to the personal and social wellbeing of the proposed represented person’. However as indicated by the italicised words, this appeared designed to oust any independent discretion to proceed to a hearing where VCATs concerns did not stem directly from material before it. This worryingly drafted provision was preferred over two VLRC ideas: its abandoned Discussion Paper limited right to make orders ‘in anticipation of future need’ (VLRC, 2012: para 12.128) and its final ‘reserve formality proposal’ as just discussed, enabling orders to be made where an immediate need was demonstrated (i.e. lack of capacity to make decisions) but there was no immediate call for a formal decision maker (paras 12.130-12.132; rec 176). To further cater for the differing levels of complexity of applications the VLRC had also proposed enriching pre-hearing stages with an expanded array of mediation, planning, investigation and other options, along with appropriate ‘triaging’ to match applications to the most appropriate process (para 21.120). It is suggested here that the original VLRC proposals should be preferred as offering a more just way of addressing any concerns as a person with developmental disability reaches the age of majority.

In practice, any expedited application procedure would be likely to mimic the much criticised ‘statutory guardianships’ in some overseas jurisdictions (LCO, 2013: 33, 37-38 [Ontario]), or Victoria’s ‘medical certification’ avenue into guardianship which was (rightly) swept away in 1986 as being inconsistent with emerging
understandings of the rights of people with disabilities, as later enshrined in CRPD principles. While VCAT did retain a more than nominal oversight role under the lapsed G&A Bill, it was far too slight. As the President of VCAT had previously observed, full hearings are vital, since hearings are about matters that ‘go to the heart of an individual’s human rights’ (quoted in VLRC, 2012: para 21.134).

[D] Conclusion.

As suggested in this paper, the challenges of balancing out the competing goals enunciated by the UN CRPD Committee in its General Comment extend well beyond deciding on the pace and degree of transformation from substitute to supported decision-making (further, Carney, 2015b).

Supported decision-making may or may not require engaging the law at all. Circles of support, micro-boards or friendship networks may better be cultivated purely within civil society, overseen simply by the advocacy, service protocols, health and welfare professional standards and other processes of the myriad of informal community, self-help, non-government and government human services agencies. However inadequate due to cost and other barriers, accountability of informal supporters may better be left to education and information strategies, or the abuse mandate of Offices of the Public Advocate (Chesterman, 2013; Feigan, 2011), in order to avoid the more egregious social policy cost of formalisation having a chilling effect on willingness to offer support, or of rendering the work of supporters less ‘visible’ (further, Carney, 2015a). If law is thought necessary, even existing principles (such as the law of associations) might be a preferable way of building clarity and accountability into the work of informal networks (LCO, 2014: 158 [discussing a Victorian OPA proposal]).

Certainly it is challenging enough to balance off, at the levels of theory or principle, say the interests of accessibility against maintenance of an adequate quality of supported decision-making whether in informal or formalised settings. And the answer to where the balance lies will not necessarily be the same across national or over state and territory borders: it is likely to vary depending on the architecture of the legal system, social services and civil society or informal
arrangements, as was demonstrated in the evaluation of the 1980s Victorian and NSW guardianship reforms, where the balance between values of autonomy and protection worked out differently in practice between jurisdictions (Carney & Tait, 1997). It becomes much more difficult to find that balance when there is so little evidence about ‘what works’ or for whom, or to what degree. This is true not only of international experience with different forms of supported decision-making enshrined in or specifically recognised by law (Kohn & Blumenthal, 2014; Kohn et al., 2013), but also informal schemes (Power et al., 2013). As Sir Anthony Mason warned regarding the perils of embarking on policy-making or legislative reform absent a sound evidence-based approach ‘[a]s things currently stand, [current] proposals seem to reflect little more than ideals that have not been carefully thought through, with the risk that they will result in experimental law-making’ (Mason, 2013: 173).

So it may be wise to lead the world by continuing to ‘hasten slowly’?
References


